ABSTRACT In the era of big data and artificial intelligence, data sharing is desirable for vigorous development of data-driven services, which improves our daily life. Although data sharing is supported to a certain extent by current mechanisms and technologies, organizations especially with potential competitive relationships might refuse to share their data due to the worry that data sharing improves competitors' competitiveness. To address this problem, this paper focuses on the competitiveness-driven target of win-win, and provides incentives to encourage potentially competing organizations to share their data. By introducing the concept of data competitiveness as a data transaction driving force, an incentive mechanism based on data competitiveness is established, which is formulated as a Stackelberg game. A gradient-based iteration algorithm is proposed to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium solution to the data sharing incentive problem. Simulation results substantiate that performance of data sharing can be improved significantly by the proposed scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of data processing algorithms and technologies, data-driven services, such as recommendation, speech recognition and image recognition, etc., have changed the style of our daily life. These services rely on a sufficient amount of high-quality data. It is noted that a wealth of data is only possessed by the large corporations, like Google, Facebook, Microsoft and Amazon [1] , which impedes the rapid development of data-driven services. Sharing data among multiple organizations is an efficient approach to address the data availability issue and improve significantly data-driven services. For instance, the sharing of scientific data can advance the progress of scientific research and provide a redundant backup for valuable data set [2] . The sharing of financial data can help detect fraud and other illegal activities by searching links between transfers [3] . Data from hospitals can predict flu outbreaks, and then help improve the response to epidemics [1] . Therefore, data sharing among multiple organizations is playing an important role in improving the quality of data-driven services and society efficiency.
Although data sharing is highly desired for vigorous development of data-driven services, which is also the trend of information technology, organizations especially with potential competitive relationships might refuse to share their data [1] , [4] . The reason is that data sharers worry that data sharing improves competitors' competitiveness. With the help of data sharing, competitors benefit a lot from the great improvement of their service quality based on the acquired data. This improves competitors' competitiveness in commercial competition. Meanwhile, data sharers reduce business due to the loss of data. This difficult situation hinders data sharers' motivation to share data. For instance, research for new medicines and general health related issues should be an area where data sharing and collaboration is critical to save lives and improve wellbeing [5] . However, these sectors are often driven by profit and discovering the next super drug, such that they are reluctant to share data [5] , [6] . In this sense, incentive mechanisms are required for organizations to encourage sharing their data. Specially, we need to develop mechnisms that ensure getting strictly better services for the organization who provides data.
In order to motivate data sharing to improve current intelligent services such as mobile sensing services, internet of things, and street view services, etc, many incentive mechanisms are proposed in the existing literature [7] - [9] . Auction theory, contract theory and game theory are popular tools to design incentive mechanisms.
In auction theory based incentive mechanisms, data buyers and data sellers achieve data collection and profit paid through a way of bid. In participatory sensing services, incentive mechanisms are applied to guarantee a stable scale of participants and to improve the performance of the sensing results [10] . In the proposed reversed-auction based incentive mechanism, participants sent their incentive expectations to the platform, and those with the lowest expectations were chosen as auction winners to carry out the sensing tasks [11] . In mobile crowdsensing, performing sensing tasks may consume a significant amount of battery power and may cause some other related costs. An incentive mechanism are designed for mobile crowdsensing, and model the data contributors recruitment as a budget-limited reverse auction [12] . In the reverse auction, mobile users submit bids, and the service provider allocates the sensing tasks, and pays compensations to the winning users [12] . Mobile edge computing that affords services to the vicinity of mobile devices is a key technology for future networks [13] . To improve resource utilization of cloudlets, double auction is used to guarantee truthfulness and system efficiency, in which buyers and sellers submit to an auctioneer their bids and asks, respectively. For such bilateral trade, a mechanism is efficient if the corresponding commodity is allocated to the buyer only when a buyer's bid is greater than the seller's ask [14] .
In contract theory based incentive mechanisms, data providers sign contracts offered by data demanders and get paid by sharing data based on the prices in the contact. To design a sharing mechanism for the crowdsourced wireless community network operator under incomplete information, a contract-based incentive mechanism is proposed in [15] , where the operator offers a set of contract items to users. Each contract consists of a Wi-Fi access price (that a user can charge others who access his AP) and a subscription fee (that a user needs to pay the operator). To balance the trade-off between privacy protection and data utility in data mining, a contract is signed by both the data owner and the data collector to define how many data that the data owner should provide, how much compensation the owner can receive, and to what extent the owner's privacy should be protected [16] .
The game theory based incentive mechanisms consider the dynamical interactions between data providers and demanders who have conflicts and commons. To collect massive sensitive data from users, a reward-based collaboration mechanism is proposed in [17] , where the master announces a total reward to be shared among collaborators, and the collaboration is successful if there are enough users wanting to collaborate. Users decide whether to join the collaboration by predicting others' costs and strategies. Stackelberg game is established to encourage the data acquisition and distributed computing [17] . To support various application traffics with high throughput and stringent delay requirements while improving energy efficiency in wireless ad hoc networks, a coalition game is designed to share the state information of wireless nodes for energy efficient topology control [18] , [19] .
Although data sharing is supported to a certain extent by above mechanisms and technologies, most of previous works are focused on data collecting and data sharing among participants with cooperative relationships. How to motivate competitive organizations to share data is largely ignored. In the cooperative data sharing scenario, data sharers and data demanders are different organizations with cooperative relationships. For instance, in the street view services, services providers are data demanders and users with smart devices as data sharers supply real-time street view data and get rewards for their sharing. There are no competition between users and services providers. In this case, users may prefer data sharing because they not only get paid by data sharing, but also enjoy better street view services after sharing data [20] , [21] .
In the data sharing among organizations with competitive relationships, it is a challenge to eliminate the competitiveness worry that data sharing improves competitors' competitiveness. In this paper, the concept of data competitiveness is introduced as a driving force to encourage data sharing. Based on data competitiveness, an incentive mechanism is established for a win-win result, which is formulated as a Stackelberg game with two levels: a data demander level and a data sharing level. The closed-form solutions to the proposed mechanism are given and a gradient-based algorithm is proposed to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium. Simulation results are presented to determine that the performance of data sharing can be improved significantly in the proposed scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The system model is presented in Section II. Stackelberg game model is formulated in Section III. In Section IV, the Stackelberg equilibrium solution is presented. Simulation results are discussed in Section V. Finally, we conclude this study in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The lack of data sharing motivation among competitive organizations comes from the worry of data sharers that competitors acquire an amount of data by data sharing and then VOLUME 6, 2018 improve their competitiveness through technical progress and even technology leapfrogging. As data sharers can not benefit from the data sharing, they are in a disadvantageous position in commercial competition, reducing the passion of data sharing. However, if data sharers obtain not only rewards such as money or reputation, but also the technical progress and commercial competitiveness, there will be a possible win-win result for data sharers and data demanders. Therefore, the concept of data competitiveness is introduced as an important incentive factor in data sharing, which is defined in Definition 1.
Definition 1 (Data Competitiveness): Data competitiveness is the ability or the technical progress to improve the quality of intelligent services, which is usually obtained by processing data. Data competitiveness has following characteristics:
• The data competitiveness of a data set can be measured by a factor γ called competitive factor.
• A data set with a higher competitive factor brings a data sharer more profit.
• Competitive factor can be decided by data sharers and data demanders and also be affected by the relation of data market supply and demand. In this paper, data competitiveness is used as a transaction driving force to motivate data sharing. In this sense, data sharers share their data to the data demander, and obtain the ability of technical progress from the data demander, which is measured by competitive factor. Thus, the data demander gains the profit by acquiring the data shared and data sharers eliminate the competitiveness worry by obtaining data competitiveness, which leads to a win-win result for data sharing participants. For example, one medical research sector can provide an efficient treatment for a certain difficult illness case by processing the experimental data. Suppose there is a medical research sector termed as A company, it wants to accelerate the medical research and improve the probability of success. A company may get the another sector termed as B company's experimental data through data sharing. In return, B company can obtain the technical progress of A company such as a part of the efficient treatment, which is the data competitiveness of the sharing experimental data.
A data sharing network based on data competitiveness is shown in Fig. 1 . The data sharing network consists of N data sharers and one data demander, which have competitive relationships. On the requirement to improve service quality, the data demander collects data from N data sharers. The data sharers are free to decide how many and what kind of data it would like to provide to the demander. Once handing over its data, the data sharer may suffer the loss of data control and potential improvement of demander's competitiveness. As data competitiveness is introduced in the data sharing model, data sharer will receive data competitiveness as compensation from the data demander. To describe the data sharing model clearly, the notations are listed in Table 1 . As shown in Fig. 1 , data sharer n shares data q n to data demander and obtains competitive factor γ n for the loss of q n . 
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In the data sharing system model, each data demander and data sharer make decisions to maximize their utilities respectively. To formulate the data sharing model based on data competitiveness, a Stackelberg game-theoretical scheme in this section is deployed to jointly consider the utility of the data sharers and data demanders. The proposed Stackelberg game can be considered a generalized Stackelberg game in which there are multiple leader and one or more followers. According to the behaviors of the data sharing participants, the proposed Stackelberg game is divided into two levels: a data demand network level game and a data sharing network level game. The data demander, as a Stackelberg follower, plays a data demander network level game. On the other hand, each data sharer, as a Stackelberg leader, plays the data sharing network level game.
A. DATA DEMANDER LEVEL GAME
In the data sharing network based on data competitiveness, a data demander aims to obtain the highest data-driven services improvement with the least possible costs by data collecting. To achieve the goal of service improvement, we assume data Q is required for a data demander. As the data is collected from the data sharers, according to the system model, data competitiveness should be paid to corresponding sharers in terms of competitive factor and data quantity. Besides, a data demander also has cost for data processing. Therefore, the utility function of the data demander in the data sharing network can be defined as
where ω is a weight, Q is the data required, F(Q) is the utility function of the data demander with regards to the data quantity required. N (N = {1, · · · , N }) denotes the data sharer set, q n denotes the data quantity collected from data sharer n, γ denotes the competitive factor and C n (q n ) denotes the data processing cost with q n . Let F(Q) denote the income obtained from processing required data, which can be expressed as [16] 
The data processing cost depends on the quality of the data, computing ability and the complexity of algorithms [22] , [23] . To ease the analysis and without loss of generality, we define C n (q n ) as
where α n > 0, β n > 0, φ > 0. Therefore, the the optimization problem for the data demander in the data sharing network can be formulated as:
B. DATA SHARING LEVEL GAME
In the data sharing level, we assume that each data sharer is independent and acts selfishly, and aims to gain as much extra profit as possible. In the data sharing interaction with data demander, they lose the control of data shared and gain the data competitiveness. Therefore, data sharer n's utility function can be defined as
where c n denotes the cost of sharing the data q n , such as the loss of data control. Therefore, the optimization problem for data sharer n in the data sharing network is
IV. STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION
For a Stackelberg game, existence and uniqueness of a Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) are two desirable properties. If we know there exists exactly one equilibrium, we can predict the equilibrium strategy of the players and obtain performance of the system [24] . In this section, we first obtain the closed-form solutions to the proposed game. Then, we prove that the solutions are the Stackelberg equilibrium for the proposed game. Finally, we prove that the Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game is unique and propose a gradient-based iteration algorithm to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium.
A. ANALYSIS OF DATA DEMANDER LEVEL GAME
To obtain the optimal data collection strategy, Lagrangian is represented for (3) as follows:
where υ is the Lagrangian multiplier. Set the derivative dL = 0, which yields the following equations:
. . .
From (7) to (8), we obtain
Substituting (10) into (9), we obtain
where = n∈N 1 2α n .
Therefore, the optimal quantity of q * n can be obtained as follows: 
As > 0 and 1 − 2α n < 0, we have ∂q * n ∂γ n < 0. Therefore, q * n decreases with the competitive factor γ n .
B. ANALYSIS OF DATA SHARER LEVEL GAME
Substituting q * n expression (12) into (5), we have max
Taking the derivative of U n to γ n and equating it to zero, we have
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Therefore, the competitive factor γ n should satisfy
Solving the above equation of γ n , we have the solution as γ * n .
Proposition 2:
The utility function U n of data sharer n is concave in its own competitive factor γ n , when the other data sharers' competitive factors are fixed and its optimal amount of data shared can be calculated in (12) .
Proof: Taking the derivative of U n to γ n , we have
Taking the second derivative of U n to γ n , we have
Since > 0 and 1 − 2α n < 0, we have
Therefore, U n is concave with respect to γ n .
C. EXISTENCE OF STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM FOR THE PROPOSED TWO-LEVEL GAME
In this subsection, we prove that the solutions q * n and γ * n are the Stackelberg Equilibrium for the proposed game. 
and when q n is fixed,
It can be verified that q * n in (12) meets Karush-Kuhn-Tucer (KKT) conditions. Based on (6), we have
and 2 L(q * n , υ) = −2α n < 0.
Therefore, q * n in (12) is the global optimum that maximizes the utility of the data demander. As q * n satisfies (19) , it is the Stackelberg Equilibrium q SE n . Due to the concavity of U n as proofed in Proposition 2, the data sharer n can always find its optimal competitive factor γ * n . Theorem 1: q * n and γ * n are the Stackelberg Equilibrium of the proposed game.
Proof: Since q * n and γ * n satisfy the expression of (19) and (20) in Definition 2, q * n and γ * n are the Stackelberg Equilibrium of the proposed game.
D. UNIQUENESS OF STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM FOR THE PROPOSED TWO-LEVEL GAME
In this subsection, we prove that the solutions q * n and γ * n are the unique Stackelberg Equilibrium for the proposed game.
In the data sharing model, the data sharers are independent and rational, and aims to maximize their benefits. The best response function can be defined and used to obtain the solution of the competitive factor problem. When the competitive factor strategies γ −n offered by the data sharers other than data sharer n are given, the best response function of data sharer n can be expressed as follows:
Combining (12) and (15), we obtain the expression of the best response function as follows:
Definition 3: If a function R n (γ −n ) is standard that for all γ −n ≥ 0 it satisfies the following three conditions, it converges to a fixed and unique point.
• Positivity:
Proof: In (24),
α n > 0, α j > 0, γ j > 0 and 2α n − 1 > 0. Therefore, R n (γ −n ) > 0 and is constant positive.
Proposition 4: The best response function
Proof:
, the function is monotonic. In this sense, the problem reduces to prove ∂R n (γ −n ) ∂γ i ≥ 0. Therefore, we obtain
As 2α n − 1 > 0, γ i ≥ 0 and γ n ≥ 0, we have ∂R n (γ −n ) ∂γ i > 0. Therefore, the best response function
The best response function R n (γ −n ) is with scalability.
Proof: Based on the expression of R n (γ −n ) in (24), we obtain ρR n (γ −n ) as follows:
and R n (ργ −n ) as follows:
Therefore, ρR n (γ −n ) − R n (ργ −n ) is expressed as
Therefore, the best response function R n (γ −n ) is with scalability. Theorem 2: q * n and γ * n are the unique Stackelberg Equilibrium for the proposed two-level game.
Proof: Since the best response function R n (γ −n ) is with positivity, monotocicity and scalability, it is standard. Therefore, the data sharer level game has the unique Nash Equilibrium and the proposed game has the unique Stackelberg Equilibrium.
To obtain the Stackelberg Equilibrium, gradient-based algorithm is adopted in the data sharing game as shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Gradient Iteration Algorithm for Stackelberg Equilibrium

Initialization:
Randomly set a competitive factor γ n of data sharer n.
Repeat the iteration:
(a). The data demander decides how much data collect from which data sharers. (b). The data sharers update the competitive factor by
End the iteration.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, computer simulations are conducted to evaluate the performance of the proposed data sharing incentive mechanism. For ease of illustration, we consider a simple data sharing network based on data competitiveness with one data demander and two data sharers. The simulation parameters are set as follows. The data required by data demander Q is 100 unit to achieve the goal of service improvement. Data weight ω = 100. The data processing complexity factor α 1 = 0.01, α 2 = 0.02, β 1 = 0.03, β 2 = 0.03, φ = 10. The data sharing cost c 1 = 1 and c 2 = 1.2. Fig.2 shows the convergence of the proposed gradient iteration algorithm for Stackelberg equilibrium, where the performance of competitive factors and data demand from data sharers over iteration are studied, respectively. As shown in Fig.2(a) , given the random competitive factor by data sharers, the algorithm can get an equilibrium after several iteration steps. The competitive factors of data sharers achieve the convergence with different values because they provide different quality of data, which is reflected in different complexity factor α. When the competitive factors of data sharers get a equilibrium, the data demand from the data sharers also converges to stable values as shown in Fig.2(b) . 
A. CONVERGENCE INVESTIGATION OF THE PROPOSED ITERATION ALGORITHM
B. COMPETITIVE FACTOR GAME INVESTIGATION
For the data sharing level, there is a competitive factor game, which means that a data sharer takes the competitive factor offered by others into account when determining its competitive factor to maximize its utility. Fig.3 shows the performance of the utility of a data sharer with the given competitive factor of other data sharers. As shown in the figure, with the increase of competitive factor of data sharer 1, the utility of data sharer 1 firstly increases and begins to decrease after reaching a certain value. As the competitive factor offered by other data sharers increases, the utility of data sharer 1 increases. The reason is that the data demander will collect more data from data sharer 1 when the other data sharers have higher competitive factor. Besides, it can be observed that with the increase of the competitive factor offered by other data sharers, data sharer 1 can get the Nash equilibrium at a higher competitive factor, which makes the best response of the data sharer 1 has a higher competitive factor and brings a higher utility. In Fig. 4 , the best response function of data sharers are depicted, where the intersection of the competitive factor curves denotes the Nash equilibrium point. with competitive factor γ 1 . For any competitive factor offered by data sharer 1, data sharer 2 offers a competitive factor γ 2 based on the best response strategy to maximize its own utility. As shown in Fig.6 , with the increase of competitive factor offered by data sharer 1, the quantity of data collected from data sharer 1 decreases and the the quantity of data collected from data sharer 2 increases correspondingly, which explains the performance of utilities of data sharers in Fig. 5 .
C. IMPACT OF DATA QUALITY ON DATA SHARING
Data quality plays an important role in the development of data-driven services. In data sharing, data with high quality can not only reduce the processing cost of the data demander to improve utility, but also bring the data sharer more benefits. Fig.7 and Fig.8 shows the impact of data quality on data sharing. When α 2 is fixed to 0.02, as the processing cost factor of data sharer 1 varies from 0.01 to 0.05, the utility of the data demander decreases. The reason is that data collected from data sharer 1 with higher α 1 means the lower quality of the data and more processing costs. Due to high processing cost of data sharer 1, the data demander is reluctant to collect data from data sharer 1 as shown in Fig.8 , resulting in the decline of the utility of data sharer 1 as shown in Fig. 7 . Correspondingly, the data shared from data sharer 2 increases as shown in Fig.8 , leading to the rise of utility of data sharer 2 as shown in Fig. 7 . Therefore, data sharers should improve the quality of owned data if they want to get more benefits from data sharing.
D. PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT WITH DATA SHARING
Without data sharing, the data demander only processes the data it already has to improve its data-driven service. On the contrary, if the data demander joins the data sharing network to collect data from data sharers, it has more data to utilize. Fig. 9 compares the utility of the data demander with the proposed data sharing mechanism to that without data sharing. As shown in the figure, as the data possessed by data demander varies from 0 to 80, the utility of data demander without data sharing increases. However, with the incentive mechanism, data demander performs much better than that without data sharing in terms of utility. It should be noticed that when the data possessed is closer to the required data, the effectiveness of data sharing slightly reduces, which is reflected that the margin of the two curves becomes narrow. This shows the fact that possessing data is important for an organization who expects to improve its data-driven services while data sharing makes the improvement better.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, an incentive mechanism based on data competitiveness has been proposed to address the competitiveness worry problem in data sharing among organizations with potential competitive relationships. By introducing data competitiveness into data sharing as a motivation factor, data demanders and data sharers are encouraged to participate in the data sharing in a market way. The incentive mechanism is then formulated into a two-level Stackelberg game. After proving the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg Equilibrium for the proposed a two-level Stackelberg game, a gradient iteration algorithm is developed to obtain the Stackelberg Equilibrium. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the proposed incentive mechanism. Future work is in progress to take the third party into consideration in the proposed data sharing framework. XIANGWEI ZHENG is currently a Professor with the School of Information Science and Engineering, Shandong Normal University, China. He has been involved in several national natural science foundation of China and is the author of more than 30 national and international publications in conferences and journals. His current research interests include, cloud computing, computer networks, and computational intelligence.
